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Abstract  
Organizations build strategic alliances with other firms with the intent of tapping into partners’ resources 
and capturing long-term value from these relationships. Such partnerships are typically governed by 
contractual or equity arrangements with clear mutual obligations. More recently, however, organizations 
started seeking strategic partnerships with open innovation communities, which are new digitally-enabled 
forms of organizing where contractual commitments are not possible. Selecting the right open innovation 
community as an alliance partner thus becomes a more difficult decision. We follow how organizational 
decision makers in two technology firms that were pioneers of forming strategic alliances with open 
innovation communities developed metrics around making such decisions. We build upon Shah and 
Swaminathan’s (2008) contingency model of alliance partner selection to consider how it applies to the 
case of partnering with open innovation communities. While we find that this framework is useful in 
framing our findings, we point out two key differences: 1) the evaluation metrics used in picking an open 
innovation community were more focused on value creation rather than value capture; and 2) open 
ecosystem considerations and not just partner-specific metrics featured prominently in this type of 
alliance partner evaluation. We develop the notions of community and ecosystem health to refer to these 
new metrics.  
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Selecting an Open Innovation Community as an Alliance Partner: 
Looking for Healthy Communities and Ecosystems 
"Here’s a technology. How powerful is the 
community that's using this technology? 
How stable is that community? Do I want 
to invest my business in it?" (Red Hat CEO, 
James Whitehurst, 2013)1. 
1 Introduction  
Inter-organizational literature is rich in studies on how and why ties are built between organizations 
(Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Kenis and Knoke 2002; Khanna and Rivkin 2006), especially those ties that 
enable digital innovation across an ecosystem (Helfat and Raubitschek 2018; Nambisan et al. 2017). This 
body of work emphasizes how the desire to tap into resources faster than competition and innovate by 
combining diverse sources of expertise (Hoang and Rothaermel 2005) compels organizations to look 
beyond their own boundaries (Gianni and Andrea 1999; Parmigiani and Rivera-Santos 2011).  
While firms are increasingly engaging with external partners for innovation and efficiency, how 
organizational decision makers actually pick an alliance partner is not well understood. We know that 
organizations are likely to choose partners that they had prior relationships with, but we know far less 
about how organizational decision makers actually conduct a potential partner evaluation (Furlotti and 
Soda forthcoming). While picking an alliance partner is not a frequent decision in organizational life, 
organizations nonetheless develop routines around such evaluations which constitute their alliance 
management capability (Li and Rowley 2002). These capabilities, however, may not be directly relevant 
when organizations are choosing a non-traditional partner with whom they cannot sign a formal contract 
or negotiate an equity arrangement (Laura and Todd 2002; Reuer and Africa 2007; Ryall and Sampson 
2009). This is particularly true when new digitally enabled forms of organizing are involved, and 
organizations seek to partner with open innovation communities (Boudreau and Lakhani 2013; Dahlander 
and Magnusson 2005; Stam 2009; West and Lakhani 2008).  
At the same time, companies, especially technology firms, are increasingly embracing open innovation 
communities as part of their innovation strategy (Dahlander 2007; Greenstein and Nagle 2014), and 
nowadays the decision of which communities to partner with is becoming more frequent. A notable aspect 
of the process of partnering with open innovation communities is that one partner, the corporation, often 
starts working with the other partner, the community, without the other ‘partner’ even becoming aware of 
it. As innovation communities use open processes and produce publicly accessible assets such as code, 
 
1 Marks, J., and Micheli, M. 2013. "Open Source Tech Is Driving Big Changes in Government," in: NextGov. 
http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2013/04/open-source-tech-driving-big-changes-government/62839/  
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designs, artwork, etc., corporations seeking to work “with them” can do so by lurking on mailing lists, 
downloading non-copyrighted art work, and taking software without asking for permission (Dahlander 
2007; De Silva et al. 2018; Germonprez et al. 2017). These freely accessible resources may mislead 
decision makers, especially those new to this phenomenon, into thinking that they are not forming an 
inter-organizational partnership, but rather just consuming goods in a public domain. Yet, there is ample 
evidence that firms that use such “open” assets over long term become strategically dependent on open 
innovation communities and face cooperation and coordination challenges common to strategic alliances 
(Dahlander and Magnusson 2008).  
While we are accumulating more and more research about the nature and implications of company 
engagement with open innovation communities (Afuah 2017; Bogers et al. 2017; Levina and Fayard 
2017; West and Sims 2017), the question of how organizational decision makers select an open 
innovation community as their alliance partner is still poorly understood. The value of engaging 
strategically with open innovation communities often does not materialize until later, meaning that 
companies have to evaluate potential for value creation (Rolland et al. forthcoming) and capture rather 
than the immediate payback. As a result, managers making decisions regarding open innovation 
engagements face a great deal of ambiguity (Fayard et al. 2016). This ambiguity is common to many 
forms of digital innovation as the boundaries between innovation processes and outcomes is murky. This 
makes it necessary to evaluate not only the potential partner’s current capabilities, but also its ability to 
adjust to future evolving needs (Nambisan et al. 2017).  
To investigate the question of how organizational decision makers choose an open innovation community 
to partner with, we conducted interviews with managers experienced in making such decisions in two 
firms that have been on the forefront of building alliances with such communities for over two decades. 
Specifically, we look at how these firms chose which open source community to engage with. Open 
source communities are a subtype of open innovation communities that have a historical track record of 
over 20 years (von Hippel 2001; von Hippel 2005). Moreover, organizations tend to choose an open 
source community often irrespective of which technological platform it is hosted on, while for newer 
forms of open innovation communities such as those producing art works or solving scientific problems, 
the choice of the platform provider that “hosts” the community often precedes the choice of the 
community. We adopted Grounded Theory Method (GMT) (Charmaz 2014; Glaser and Strauss 1967) and 
collected data from open-ended interviews and archival documents to learn how managers that, in fact, 
started facing a choice of communities to engage with as the practice of open sourcing became more 
widespread actually made such choices. Our findings reveal that after a number of initial setbacks and 
surprises in early years, managers leading open source projects were able to develop new approaches for 
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choosing an open innovation community. We analyze their setbacks and successes and develop a 
framework showing how managers probe for a healthy community and a healthy ecosystem.     
2 Background Literature and Theory 
2.1 Partner Selection in Alliance Building 
While strategic alliance literature is rich and well established, its primary focus has been on commercial 
inter-firm relationships governed by contractual or equity arrangements. Given the novelty of digital 
organizing, it is not surprising that this research has not focused on how organizations form alliances with 
open innovation communities. Yet these new types of external relations share some of the same aims as 
those characterizing commercially-governed strategic alliances. Kale and Singh’s (2009) extensive review 
of the strategic alliance literature provides a classification of commercial governance mechanisms and 
aims of diverse inter-organizational relationships. Their writing distinguishes strategic alliances from 
other types of interfirm relations through the nature of its long-term strategic scope rather than through its 
governance mechanism (contract or equity). In particular, they term “non-traditional contractual 
partnerships” as alliances that include aims such as conducting joint R&D and marketing activities, 
accessing mutually complementary assets and skills, and participating in joint standard setting. Open and 
user innovation literature demonstrates that firms that engage with open innovation communities over the 
long term typically share the very same aims (e.g., Afuah et al. 2018; Dahlander and Magnusson 2008; 
von Hippel 2005). Thus, while strategic alliance literature has not discussed such arrangements directly, it 
may still offer fruitful insights on how companies may go about selecting a strategic partner, albeit with 
the caveat that it reports on studies of partnerships governed by commercial terms.  
There are three main streams of research that focus on partner selection in alliances (see Table 1). The 
first stream argues that alliance partners are largely chosen based on a partner’s ability to provide 
resources that the other partner is seeking at the time of partnership formation (Furlotti and Soda 
forthcoming; Mitsuhashi and Greve 2009). This very rich stream of research establishes that firms seek 
partners with both complementary resources (where differences in resources are seen as productive) and 
compatible resources (where similarity in resources makes collaboration among firms more feasible) 
(Mitsuhashi and Greve 2009). More recent work adds nuance to this perspective by arguing that beyond 
the alliance’s strategic goals, the needs of a specific task for which the alliance has been formed and the 
relative power associated with each partner’s own resources shape alliance tie formation (Furlotti and 
Soda forthcoming). Literature on corporate engagement with open innovation communities echoes the 
sentiment that partnerships with such communities are often based on complementarity and compatibility 
of task-related resources involved in the relationship. Corporations often partner with communities to 
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innovate on specific tasks by tapping into resources that they are missing internally (Afuah and Tucci 
2012; Dahlander and Wallin 2006; Felin and Zenger 2014), but for which they have relevant absorptive 
capacity (Lichtenthaler and Lichtenthaler 2009), complementary IP (Lakhani and Lonstein 2011), and/or 
access to markets (Vanhaverbeke et al. 2008). The literature argues that these complementary resources 
allows corporate partners to capture value generated by the relationship with the community. 
The second stream of literature embraces the importance of resource considerations in the choice of a 
strategic alliance partner but points out that such partnerships are built for the long term and hence entail 
dealing with a significant amount of change and adjustment. This perspective highlights the importance of 
looking at the phenomenon dynamically and accounting for the alliance development processes (Das and 
Teng 2000; Koza and Lewin 1998). This perspective pays special attention to the co-evolution of the 
partner relationship as partners learn more about each other, discover new sources of value, and develop 
capabilities specifically to address the other partner’s needs (Koza and Lewin 1998). Keeping an eye on 
long-term value creation based not only on the current situation but also on the potential for resource 
development and relationship evolution can become an important strategic consideration (Das and Teng 
2000). Moreover, researchers have found that past experience with a specific partner in other business 
relations (e.g., alliances formed for a different task) and their willingness and ability to adjust to the focal 
firm’s needs is likely to lead to the same partner being selected again for a new task (Li and Rowley 
2002). The focus on the alliance development process and relationship co-evolution is particularly likely 
to be relevant to our research context as engaging with a community for an innovation-related task is full 
of uncertainties, ambiguity, and turbulence (Felin and Zenger 2014; Germonprez et al. 2017).   
The third stream of research points out that new partnerships arise on the basis of historically established 
formal and informal social network ties. Specifically, organizations often partner when they belong to a 
single legal entity such as a parent company (Faems et al. 2008; Gulati 1995; Reuer and Africa 2007), 
when they are part of an inter-organizational business network with a common third party who may serve 
as a broker, or when they occupy a particular structural position in an inter-organizational network (Furr 
and Shipilov 2018; Obstfeld 2005). This literature pays special attention to the social capital that 
accumulates in inter-organizational networks. It often refers to relational contracting (Baker et al. 2002) 
as a mechanism for preventing opportunistic behavior and ensuring long-term cooperation. Relational 
contracts in strategic alliances complement or even subsume formal contracts (Laura and Todd 2002; 
Ryall and Sampson 2009), which are hard to specify fully in long-term uncertain relationships. Relations 
in a business network help foster new ties through trust-building mechanisms, potential partners’ global 
and local reputations, and their social network position (Carson et al. 2006). Given that corporations often 
engage with open innovation communities without a formal contract and rely heavily on building good 
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relationships, the network perspective on alliance formation may be particularly relevant to us (Dahlander 
and Magnusson 2008; Dahlander and Magnusson 2005). Open innovation literature highlights the 
importance of relational governance over other types of governance (e.g., contracts, contests, 
employment) when engaging with an open innovation community as opposed to other forms of open 
innovation (Felin and Zenger 2014). Moreover, strong network effects in digital goods markets 
(Eisenmann et al. 2009) further increase the importance of this perspective in our context. 
Table 1: Literature Streams on Partner Tie Formation in Strategic Alliances 
Streams Focus Sample papers 
Resource 
complementarity, 
compatibility, and 
fit 
This stream argues that alliance partners are 
selected based on matching task or project needs 
with the resources that alliance partners have (to 
address this need).    
(Furlotti and Soda forthcoming; 
Kale and Singh 2009; Li and 
Rowley 2002; Mitsuhashi and 
Greve 2009; Premkumar et al. 
2005; Shah and Swaminathan 
2008; Zhiang et al. 2009) 
Potential for 
productive partner 
co-evolution 
This stream acknowledges the dynamics in 
alliance relationships and argues that partners 
may be chosen based on their future potential 
and may emerge or dissolve as the partners and 
the network around them evolve.   
(Das and Teng 2000; Doz 1996; 
Koza and Lewin 1998; Li and 
Rowley 2002) 
 
 
Social relations in 
an inter-
organizational 
network 
This stream sees contracts, both market and 
relational, as the basis of partner selection in 
alliances. Alliance ties are formed based on prior 
ties, common third parties, or specific structural 
positions in inter-organizational networks.  
 
(Faems et al. 2008; Figueiredo 
and Silverman 2017; Furr and 
Shipilov 2018; Gibbons and 
Henderson 2012; Gulati 1995; 
Obstfeld 2005; Reuer and Africa 
2007) 
 
While prior work has focused on analyzing archival data on historical alliance tie formation, recent work 
has pointed out the need to understand the evaluation criteria and processes that are actually used by 
organizational actors when selecting alliance partners (Furlotti and Soda forthcoming; Shah and 
Swaminathan 2008). Shah and Swaminathan (2008) published a pioneering study that proposes and tests 
a framework identifying the relative importance of four key categories of evaluation criteria -- trust, 
commitment, complementarity, and financial payoff - in choosing a partner (see Figure 1). They draw on 
organizational control theory (Ouchi 1980; Ouchi 1979) to propose that one of the four evaluation factors 
is likely to dominate the final decision depending on the nature of the task and process involved in the 
relationship. They identify two key variables that determine which evaluation criteria are most important 
in choosing an alliance partner: outcome interpretability, which refers “to the degree of difficulty 
associated with being able to interpret or understand with certainty the exact outcomes of a particular 
project,” and process manageability, which refers to “the amount of communication required by partners 
for the effective coordination and control of alliance activities” (Shah and Swaminathan 2008, p. 474, 
emphasis original). Ouchi’s (1979, 1980) control theory argues that when outcome interpretability is low, 
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a project owner has to rely more on process/behavioral rather than outcome controls. If process controls 
are also hard to establish, often due to the lack of the project owner’s knowledge about the process, then 
one has to rely on “clan” controls – usually associated with common identity, reciprocity, mutual trust, 
and shared culture. Shah and Swaminathan (2008) argue that alliance partners are evaluated primarily 
based on their likelihood to fit a particular alliance control approach that is likely to govern the 
partnership. For example, financial payoffs are most important when planning to use outcome controls, 
while trust dominates the decision when planning to use clan control. 
 Process manageability: 
 Low (difficult) 
 
Process manageability: 
High  (easy) 
Outcome interpretability: 
 Low (difficult to interpret) 
Most critical: 
Trust 
 
Most critical: 
Complementarity 
 
Outcome interpretability: 
High (easy to interpret) 
Most critical: 
Commitment 
 
Most critical: 
Financial payoff 
 
Figure 1: Contingency Model of Partner Selection and Attractiveness 
 (Shah and Swaminathan 2008) 
 
Delving further into this framework, Shan and Swaminathan (2008) pay special heed to evaluating the 
trust potential of the partner, arguing that it can be broken down into benevolence-based trust that focuses 
on a partner’s good will and the lack of propensity to engage in opportunistic behavior and competence-
based trust that focuses on the partner’s consistent demonstration of credibility and expertise (p. 474).  
While this pioneering paper offers many useful insights, the overall stream of research on decision 
making processes in partner selection is still in relative infancy, perhaps because it is very difficult to 
gather relevant data with real organizations. Shah and Swaminathan (2008) had to rely on MBA students 
analyzing hypothetical scenarios to test their framework. Other researchers had to infer evaluation criteria 
that probably played into the partner choice by using archival data and comparing ties that were formed to 
those that could have been formed, but were not (Li and Rowley 2002).  
Trying to apply insights of Shah and Swaminathan’s (2008) framework to the question of how companies 
choose which open innovation community to partner with presents many challenges. For one, companies 
can try to assess the financial payoff of the relationship by focusing on specific outputs produced by a 
community such as ideas, designs, and products. Those could be counted and measured, but they may not 
lead to financial payoffs given that these outputs are equally accessible to the firm’s competitors and 
given that the long-term reliance on a volunteer community for such outcomes in the absence of any 
contractual obligations may be problematic (Dahlander and Magnusson 2008; Germonprez et al. 2017). 
Similarly, one cannot force volunteer members to make a commitment to a corporate project. Community 
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members could be recruited as employees, but this may be met with resistance from the community. 
Volunteers can also be encouraged to make further commitments if they identify with the firm (Spaeth et 
al. 2015), but a guaranteed commitment of volunteers is not possible. Complementarity, which in Shah 
and Swaminathan’s (2008) framework refers to partners having a joint stake in maintaining a good public 
image with key external stakeholders such as customers, is also hard to assess. For example, public 
attitudes towards whether proprietary and open source software are complementary or competing change 
drastically over time (Dahlander and Wallin 2006; Morgan and Finnegan 2010). Finally, how do firms 
evaluate potential for building trust with an open innovation community before they have had a chance to 
work with it? Unlike commercial alliances, if an open innovation community fails to cooperate well with 
a corporation, it may not suffer any reputation losses and indeed may even gain reputation in certain 
circles (O'Mahony and Bechky 2008; Shah 2006).  The question of benevolence-based trust is particularly 
hard to assess due to the nature of organizing on digital platforms, where a corporate stakeholder may 
have no way of assessing offline identity of participants. This lack of verifiable identity may expose 
corporate partners to strategic risks if such anonymous participants are, for example, competitors.  
2.2 Partner Selection in Corporate Engagement with Open Innovation Communities 
Organizations may engage with open innovation communities, and in particular open source 
communities, for a variety of reasons. In the simplest case, they may use open source software in their 
daily operations for cost-saving reasons (Kwan and West 2005). Increasingly, however, firms seek 
strategic value from engaging with open source communities that comes from co-developing software and 
services with open source communities (Agerfalk and Fitzgerald 2008; Dahlander and Magnusson 2008; 
Kwan and West 2005). Prior literature generally posits three types of benefits for such engagement: 1) 
cost savings that come from using “free” external code, documentation, and testing; 2) innovation 
potential of co-developing products with a diverse community of contributors and speeding up 
innovation; and 3) increasing adoption of software by making it open, which deters competition and 
enables sales of complementary products and services through the ecosystem (Baldwin and von Hippel 
2011; Dahlander and Magnusson 2008; Dedrick and West 2007; Kapoor and Agarwal forthcoming). The 
literature suggests, however, that there are significant strategic risks involved in corporate engagement 
with open innovation communities stemming from the co-dependency between the firm and the 
community, the loss of control over what is being developed, the need to protect company IP, and 
reputational exposure (Baldwin and Clark 2006; Dahlander and Magnusson 2008; Stuermer et al. 2009). 
Most work in the area of evaluation in open source software from corporate standpoint addresses only the 
first goal of cost reduction by focusing on evaluating various aspects of the software code and 
accompanying documentation. Besides evaluating which software features are supported (Gupta and 
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Singla 2012; Mijinyawa and Abdulwahab 2014; Money et al. 2012), this research discusses traditional 
metrics for software quality (Fuggetta 2003; Spinellis et al. 2009; Stamelos et al. 2002), maturity and 
reliability (Aberdour 2007; Petrinja et al. 2009), and maintainability (Samoladas et al. 2004). The 
recommended assessments focus both on direct measures, such as the number of lines of code, 
availability of documentation, number of commits and bug reports, and quality of test plans, as well as 
indirect measures, such as the number of downloads, which is argued to be a good proxy for quality (see 
Vijaya et al. 2017 for a recent review). However, this literature also acknowledges that in practice, formal 
evaluation criteria are rarely used, and that familiarity with the product often drives the selection 
(Torchiano and Morisio 2004).  
Besides open source literature focused on software evaluation, we have not found any literature that 
focuses on choosing which community has a good potential to serve as a corporate innovation partner – 
the second key goal of such relationships. Most studies on open innovation communities either focus on a 
single community working with a single corporation (e.g., Schlagwein and Bjørn-Andersen 2014) or 
study experiences of different firms each working with a specific open innovation community trying to 
unpack what happens once the relationship has already been established (Dahlander and Magnusson 
2005; Germonprez et al. 2017; Naparat et al. 2015). There is a significant body of literature focused on 
factors that enable sustainability of open source communities and ecosystems (Crowston et al. 2006; 
Jansen 2014), but this literature is typically not concerned with corporate engagement and takes an 
“inward” perspective.  
Regarding the third key strategic value, namely, the desire to speed up the adoption of new products and 
services through this model, the discussion of which community would help a firm achieve this goal is 
also missing. A firm can capture value through such engagements by deterring competition and 
commercializing complementary products and services (Adner 2006; Alexy and Reitzig 2013; Dahlander 
and Magnusson 2008; Zhu and Zhou 2012). Yet, a community is often engaged with other for-profit firms 
potentially competing with the focal firm in trying to capture value created through an open ecosystem 
(Adner 2006; Davis 2016; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999; Helfat and Raubitschek 2018; Nambisan et al. 
2017). Because most empirical studies of corporate engagement with open innovation consider one digital 
ecosystem at a time (e.g., Linux), the question of how a choice of a partner community influences firm’s 
engagement with a wider ecosystem has not been researched.   
Aside from a robust set of metrics used for assessing software quality, it is apparent that the literature has 
generally remained silent on how corporations make a choice among alternative communities for long-
term engagement. We focus our investigation on this important question: how do organizational decision 
makers select an open innovation community as their alliance partner?  
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3 Methodology  
A grounded theory-building approach (Charmaz 2011; Glaser 1987; Glaser and Strauss 1967) was chosen 
because our goal is to develop a theoretical understanding of a relatively new and poorly theorized 
phenomenon. We embraced an abductive approach to grounded theorizing (Charmaz 2011; Charmaz 
2014; Charmaz and Belgrave 2015; Richardson and Kramer 2006) that maintains that researchers always 
bring their prior knowledge and research interests in theorizing a phenomenon, and hence the theory 
developed on the basis of data is not purely inductive in its nature (Urquhart and Fernandez 2013).  
3.1 Research Sites 
During our initial data collection in early 2010, we became interested in exploring broad issues associated 
with firm engagements with multiple open innovation communities. With very few firms at the time 
having extensive experience with multiple open innovation communities, obtaining access to corporate 
decision makers who have considered more than one open innovation community as a potential partner 
was a challenge. It was important that we obtained cooperation at the firm level, as opposed to solely 
individual decision makers in order to corroborate interviews with archival records to reduce recall bias. 
We obtained access to a leading technology firm (Company A2) that was one of the pioneers of corporate 
engagement with open sourcing. We gained entry when a senior manager, who after attending the first 
author’s presentation at a conference, expressed interest in participating in a research project on open 
source engagements. When collecting data from Company A, we decided to seek another firm with rich 
open sourcing history because we had exhausted relevant interview subjects at the first firm but had not 
yet reached theoretical saturation (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Guest et al. 2006). We wanted to find firms 
with similar histories of open source engagements so as to make decision-level analysis across both firms 
more comparable. We were able to negotiate access to Company B by soliciting participation on a 
mailing list of open source developers and inviting those with corporate email addresses to contact us. 
Company A and B were fairly similar in terms of firm size, global business model (MNCs), workforce 
composition, market position, and brand. They also had similar histories of engaging with multiple open 
source communities for more than a decade. Company A started its journey slightly before Company B 
and engaged with a greater number of communities, which resulted in it having experienced more 
“growing pains” as a pioneer, as well as showing greater evolution in its thinking than Company B. In 
addition, Company A engaged in a greater number of end-user focused applications developed by open 
source communities. In our analysis, this meant that Company A ended up paying more attention to 
network effects associated with open source product ecosystems than Company B.  
 
2 Both company names are pseudonyms used to protect the identities of the research site and respondents  
11 
 
There were no other notable differences revealed in our data between Companies A and B when it came 
to the research question we posed. Both firms engaged with close to 100 open source development 
projects and stated publicly that they had contributed 1000+ employees to these communities. Both firms 
continued to use more traditional methods of in-house software development alongside open source 
community engagement. Respondents from both firms stated similar reasons for engaging with 
communities; both firms sought a strategic first-mover advantage with a particular community and were 
exploring a new model of competition more broadly.  
We reached theoretical saturation in our data collection after 39 interviews across two firms, and towards 
the end, our emergent theory began to explain the newly collected data quite well (Glaser and Strauss 
1967; Guest et al. 2006). To ensure that our findings were not specific only to large, leading technology 
firms, we interviewed two additional senior decision makers from smaller firms that had a history of 
repeated community selection decisions because they focused their strategies on partnering with open 
source communities (Dahlander 2007). While we focus our analysis and writing on the data collected 
from Companies A and B, the data from these new interviews reinforced our findings.   
3.2 Interviews and Documents 
While our data collection involved a broad set of issues around corporate engagement with open 
innovation communities, in this paper we draw specifically on data pertaining to how the community 
choice decision was made. This data came from two sources: 1) in-depth semi-structured interviews and 
2) archival documents. Table 2 summarizes the data that were analyzed for this paper.   
Table 2: Data Used for Analysis 
Data Sources Data Collected Analytical Purpose 
In-depth semi-structured interviews 
- 36 company 
employees  
(~ 1-1.5 hours)  
- 3 open source 
engagement leaders  
(~ 4 hours)  
- 996 single-spaced 
pages of interview 
transcripts 
- Understanding construction of value of open 
source engagement  
- Open source engagement history and 
management practices at each firm 
- Differences in subjective judgements vs official 
statements  
Archival documents 
- Online company 
materials and reports 
- Public blogs and news 
clippings 
- Meeting minutes  
- Slide decks used to 
explain open source 
engagement to other 
- 47 (Co A) + 62 (Co B) 
documents on open 
source engagement 
- 21 public reports & 
numerous news 
articles 
- 36 meeting minutes  
- 49 slide decks 
- Understanding company background with open 
source engagement, and media view 
- Detailed data on specific open source engagement 
projects (numbers, types, and durations) 
- Comparison with subjective perceptions reported 
in interviews 
- Comparison between public vs internal 
justifications 
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stakeholders and get 
their support 
- Evolution of open source engagement strategy, 
practices, and evaluation over time 
 
3.2.1 Interviews 
In 2010 and 2011, we conducted 39 interviews with US- and European-based employees across both 
companies. Each interview lasted for at least an hour and a half, but interviews with key informants who 
had been with each company for many years and were leading open source engagement efforts lasted as 
long as 4.5 hours. They were carried out in person (14) and over videoconferencing (30). They involved 
top and middle managers as well as software developers in open source projects (see Table 3).  
This study began with exploratory questions about engagement of companies with open source 
communities. In early 2010 the literature on open source communities was quite large, but the new 
phenomenon of corporate engagement with open source was not well understood. Hence, the first author 
began open-ended interviews with employees from Company A to learn about the goals, processes, and 
consequences involved in the firm’s engagement with open source communities. In initial interviews, the 
first author noticed that many interviewees were complaining about struggling with questions of which 
communities they should be engaged with, and which were not worth the effort. At the same time the 
interviewees indicated that their own understanding of engaging with communities had evolved over time. 
The first author then revised the interview guide to focus more on the questions of community selection. 
As a result, the final interview guide explored questions about the nature of the company’s engagement 
with open source communities, what attracted the company to the community, and how the experience of 
engagement with a given community shaped subsequent community selection and management decisions. 
Table 3. Interviews Conducted 
Interviewee Role  Company A  Company B  
Senior managers  2 3 
Middle managers in technology, marketing, human resources, 
and strategy groups 
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10 
Developers  5 4 
Subtotal Company Interviews 22 17 
Total  39 
 
3.2.2 Archival Documents 
We collected both public documents from websites, blogs, and news articles and internal corporate 
documents pertaining to each company’s open source community engagements. Interview subjects often 
shared with us corporate, time-stamped documents, which helped us understand their interpretations of 
the past (Miller et al. 1997). Of particular value were slide presentations and memos that were sent out 
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over the years about open source adoption to explain to other stakeholders within the same company the 
decision-making process and rationale behind open source related decisions. At the time of active data 
collection (finished in 2011), we found 1095 publicly available documents for Company A, which were 
mostly technical in nature. Only 47 of them were relevant to evaluation activities that were identified in 
the interviews. The same search for Company B resulted in 4,230 documents, of which 4,132 were related 
to technical issues, but only 62 were relevant to our study themes. Public websites for each firm were also 
used to identify pages discussing each firm’s open source engagement activities. The archival data 
provided solid background context to make sense of each firm’s overall goals and of the specific 
historical references made by managers in interviews.   
3.3 Data Analysis 
Following GTM guidelines (Glaser 1987; Glaser and Strauss 1967), iterative data analysis took place 
during the period of intense data collection, which involved documenting emergent themes in memos and 
using these themes to identify subsequent interview subject, modify subsequent interview questions, and 
pursue new archival data. We relied on open coding and memoing as our key analytical tools (Charmaz 
2006; Rouse 2016).  
Our diverse data sources gave us both process and cross-sectional views of the phenomenon that we 
studied. We developed a cross-sectional perspective on the question based on interviewees sharing with 
us which evaluation criteria they used in evaluating communities, how these criteria match their 
organizational goals, and how they compared to what they were used to in choosing corporate partners.  
We developed a process perspective on our phenomena based on a number of data sources. First, our 
interviews were conducted over a 2-year period during which corporate open sourcing was maturing as 
practice. Second, firms A and B started adopting open source at different times, with A demonstrating 
more mature practices. Third, when we asked our informants about how they made choices among open 
source communities, they inevitably shared with us both what they were doing currently and how they 
had arrived at it by learning from their own past mistakes and by discovering new goals for such 
engagements. Finally, we had access to almost all company documents on how such decisions were made 
over time, which showed us both quantitative and qualitive evaluation criteria that were institutionalized 
across the firm. For several key open source projects for each firm, we were able to document in 
substantial detail the evolution in the goals of such engagements, evaluation criteria, and new challenges. 
All these sources of data allowed us to draw a distinction between cases when companies were deciding 
to fully engage with certain communities and when they were merely “probing” by engaging at a small 
scale to help them conduct a better evaluation.  
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We transcribed all the interviews and coded them using Atlas.ti content analysis software. The initial set 
of open codes reached 89 categories. A discussion between both researchers helped refine the open 
codebook down to 61 first-order concepts, which were used for subsequent coding. While the new first 
order concepts fit the data well and memos revealed some novel insights, the relationship of the first order 
concepts to our research question lacked parsimony (Walsh et al. 2015). To address this we related our 
inductive findings to extant literature on corporate open source engagements, software vendor evaluation, 
alliance partner selection, and ecosystems into our analysis of emergent themes to develop a clearer 
narrative (Charmaz 2006; Glaser and Strauss 1967).   
As part of the process (Muller 2014), we identified the following themes in our memos: 1) distinctive 
challenges faced by companies when considering to engage with open innovation communities; 2) nature 
and type of these challenges; 3) evolving formalized and informal criteria used by managers to judge a 
particular community; 4) changing object of the evaluation (e.g., product, community, ecosystem); 5); 
relationships of evaluation criteria to value capture, trust, complementarity and commitment; and 6) the 
tension between judging an observable outcome and trying to control and uncertain process. These 
allowed us to generalize from the first-order concepts (e.g., “number of core developers who dropped out 
in protest to corporate involvement in the community”) to the second-order themes (“community 
orientation towards corporate engagements”) and aggregate dimensions (“community friendliness to 
corporation”) (following Corley and Gioia 2004). These analyses helped us uncover how decision-making 
changed over time from looking for open innovation communities as providers of specific products with 
certain features towards looking for healthy communities and healthy ecosystems. In our final analysis 
presented in Appendix 1, we found that relating our findings to Shah and Swaminathan’s (2008) work 
helped integrate our insights into a cohesive framework.  
In the next section, we will focus on the cross-sectional findings, while also noting how managers 
recognized that their ability to choose a community shifted from quantitative evaluation criteria assessed 
at a distance to experiential understanding of whether a community that they are experimenting with is a 
good long-term partner or potentially could be nurtured to become one. We will elaborate this process-
focused perspective further in the discussion section.  
4 Selecting an Open Source Community as an Alliance Partner 
Commercial alliance partnerships are a common occurrence in software industry, so it is not surprising 
that managers in our study initially treated the open source community selection process using the same 
approaches as they were used to in picking software vendors. However, they soon realized that the initial 
metrics did not work well in this new environment:  
15 
 
“[Many managers] have grown up in a software industry that has been defined by vendors, defined 
by vendor relationships.… I think, that with open source you have to experience and do in order to 
be a credible participant and, you know, make [yourself] a credible commentator on it.” (Senior 
Manager – Company B). 
Below we overview how managers who were focused on building long-term partnerships engaged in a 
journey of learning how to make this new type of partner choice. Their approaches varied from project to 
project as well as based on their reflections upon lessons from prior projects and included 1) evaluating 
communities based on the value of the tangible outcomes they were offering, 2) understanding which 
communities are viable and could be relied on long term, 3) probing for which communities are friendly 
in partnering with corporations based on their ideology, processes, and governance; and 4) evaluating the 
health of an ecosystem comprised of a variety of external parties involved with the community as users 
and contributors. While our interviewees learned over time which evaluation metrics worked for which 
engagement goal, our data does not suggest that decision makers need to go through these phases of 
learning. Rather, each phase was associated with uncovering how a particular set of evaluation criteria for 
a partner achieved a certain goal, but not necessarily other goals. 
4.1 Looking for Valuable Open Products and Services 
Faced with the mandate from the top management to partner with open source communities for strategic 
gains, decision makers on the ground were struggling to relate what they were used to with corporate 
partner selection to the new mandate.  As a result, they focused on the most visible aspects of an open 
source community’s outputs such as open source license type (more or less corporate friendly), software 
product features, quality of the code, documentation, and support services. Our corporations have 
previously developed templates and metrics for evaluating the choice of commercial vendors to ensure 
financial payoffs from the relationships. In such alliances, there is an expectation of long-term 
dependence on the partner as software gets embedded in wider organizational processes and integrated 
with other technologies. This means that software upgrades, responsiveness to fixing bugs, and other 
support services were typically used as part of Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) calculations. Decision 
makers at Companies A and B tried to adapt these calculations to the new environment.   
Soon, however, they discovered a challenge in adopting these metrics, as support services that were 
usually ensured through contractual arrangements with the partner were not guaranteed by an open source 
community. This meant that they had to either contract with 3rd party vendors supporting open source 
products (e.g., Red Hat for Linux), rely on the historical track record of a community in providing support 
services, or dedicate internal employees. While the cost of contracting for third party support services was 
fairly easy to obtain, these services were only available for a handful of widely adopted open source 
products. For many other open source engagements, the firm needed to either rely on support provided by 
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the open source community or invest in maintaining a proprietary version of the software. The latter 
meant forgoing the benefits of openness and incurring the cost of re-integrating with the open version 
when the two diverged. The option of relying on the community for support, if such support was of high 
quality was by far preferable. Thus, evaluating a community’s track record of providing support services 
became a key part of our firms’ assessment of the potential partner. Decision makers developed “metrics 
around sort of velocity of Q&A and velocity of resolution of issues.” When this option failed, traditional 
project cost estimation tools were used to calculate internal support costs to be included into the Total 
Cost of Ownership calculation. Table 4 summarizes metrics used by decision makers to pick communities 
based on the costs and benefits of products and services that they were offering. 
Table 4: Evaluating Community’s Product and Services  
2nd order theme 1st order concept 
Product features - Fit with corporate needs  
Software quality - Community size as proxy for testing (many developers ‘eyeballing’ the 
code) 
- Number of downloads by users (indirect measure of software approval) 
- Number and variety of email threads interrogating issues with the code 
 
Documentation 
availability 
- Availability of wiki HOW TO pages 
- Accessible FAQ pages 
- Level of detail of documentation 
- Speed of updating documentation 
 
Corporate-friendly license 
type 
- Reciprocity level demanded by the license 
- Possibility to dual license the software 
 
Track record of 
community-based support  
- Average velocity of Q&A  
- Average time for issue resolution  
 
3rd party support costs - Costs of contracting with 3rd parties for support services (only available for 
popular open source products) 
 
Internal support costs - Personnel cost of providing support services 
- Costs of maintaining multiple versions and reintegrating repeatedly 
 
 
4.2 Looking for a Viable Community 
As Companies A and B were experimenting with the new open source model, they started appreciating 
the innovativeness and quality of some of these products that came from the diversity, transparency, and 
open processes of such communities: 
“I believe that what makes [open source] special is what I call the copy modify, share cycle [of 
code development]. … This type of innovation might be better referred to as ‘diversity,’ because 
that is really what the great thing that you are getting is -- the ability to follow lots of bets at once” 
(Manager – Company B). 
Moreover, firms’ customers, to their surprise, held open source-based development in high regard and 
started pushing A and B towards offering more such products and services. As a result, in some areas, our 
firms moved from simply experimenting with this new model towards adopting it as part of their strategic 
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market offerings. This, in turn, meant that the firms that we studied, and their customers, needed to be 
able to rely on the community to keep innovating and supporting the product over long term.   
Defining a community that corporate stakeholders could rely upon over time was not easy, as there were 
no readily available measures. Outcome-focused measures (from Table 4) were useful indicators of a 
community’s output to date but not a guarantee of continuing innovation and quality. Thus, some 
forward-looking managers started developing new metrics that moved beyond the cost-benefit analysis of 
products and services and towards assessing a community’s viability: 
 “How many people are in the community, how many people contribute, how often do they release, 
how many bugs they have on a given release? How many days does it typically take for a bug to be 
resolved on the community, how has it grown or shrunk overtime? … And those are the things that 
you evaluate to begin with and then monitor overtime to understand the viability of the [open 
source] project.” (Manager – Company A).  
The focus on viability meant paying attention to a community’s evolution and momentum over time, 
looking for signs that the community was growing both in terms of product output and in the size and 
diversity of developer base. Managers learnt that by gathering open project metrics, which were readily 
available for many large open source projects through their version control software, which at the time 
was SourceForge (and more recently became GitHub). The development mailing provided managers with 
details about the key developers making substantial changes to the code. The vibrancy of the developer 
base was associated with a healthy amount of participant turnover and an opportunity for new members to 
rise in influence to become part of the core group. As a community grew, it was important that its 
members took on different roles, not only by contributing new code, but also by improving the product, 
reporting bugs, building new releases, and providing support. Informants in both firms noted that while 
they could gather a number of quantitative measures around community viability, they also often found it 
useful to probe the community through some peripheral participation to get a qualitative sense for its 
vibrancy.  Table 5 summarizes metrics used in evaluating community viability. 
Table 5. Evaluating Community’s Viability  
2nd order theme 1st order concept 
Vibrancy of the developer base - Number of active contributors 
- Growth of active contributors 
- Renewal of the core contributor group 
- Turnover of participants 
Growth of the code base - Lines of code 
- Number of subsystems 
Attention paid to software 
quality improvements 
- Number of bug reports 
- Number of upgrade patches made available 
- Number of testers (members eyeballing code) 
- Number of responses to questions  
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4.3 Probing for a Collaboration Partner Friendly to Corporations 
As Companies A and B deepened their reliance on open source software, they increasingly encountered 
that open source products did not fully address their (or their customers’) needs. Addressing this 
challenge by creating a propriety version of the software -- decoupled from the open source versions -- 
was less and less appealing, as nobody wanted to forgo the innovation and quality advantages provided by 
open source communities. This meant that companies had to find ways of collaborating with communities 
so as to entice them to accommodate company-specific needs. There were no readily-available a priori 
indicators of whether a given community would support company’s agenda. Given no possibility of 
contracting with a community to support corporate needs, our firms started probing for open source 
communities where their influence would be accepted, and perhaps even embraced, and where 
community work practices were accessible to external parties.  
Whereas before, decision makers were evaluating products and services first, now they were willing to 
give up the current fit between what communities were offering and what they needed, and instead 
consider whether “the direction of the community [was] in line with the direction of the given [internal] 
product team long term” (Manager, Company A). If the directions were aligned, they started asking 
“which communities are open to corporate influence and work in a way that allows corporations to build 
productive relationships with them” (Manager, Company A).  Communities that were averse to corporate 
involvement on the basis of ideological reasons simply resisted requests from corporate employees, or 
anybody for that matter who was not part of the core group of developers.  
A bigger issue arose when corporate development teams wanted to influence the core of the open 
software. The core source code was the crown jewel carefully guarded by a community, and it was not 
easy to influence. Companies were faced with a dilemma of needing to choose the community before they 
could fully assess whether their influence over the core product would be accepted. Our informants, when 
pushed by us to articulate what helped them to make an engagement decision in such circumstances, 
inevitably directed their responses to the governance form of the community. They were looking for 
communication, role, and authority structures that mirrored the corporate world. Some communities had 
more obvious authority structures, which made it easier for firms to distinguish who the influencers were. 
Other communities were more democratic. Managers argued that, “You need some sort of executive 
decision-making capacity within the open community” (Manager, Company B). They could then reach 
out to this authority in the hopes of receiving a definitive response. As one manager observed, too much 
democracy in the community could lead to corporate participants saying, “The hell with you, I’ve got to 
serve my customers” (Manager, Company B). Table 6 summarizes how managers evaluated a 
community’s friendliness to corporations.  
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Table 6. Evaluating Community’s Friendliness to Corporations  
2nd order theme 1st order concept 
Community’s 
orientation 
towards corporate 
engagements 
- Evidence that past decisions were based on ideological rather than pragmatic grounds 
- Number of core developers who dropped-out in protest to corporate involvement in the 
community 
- Stated attitudes of community leaders towards corporate involvement  
- The degree of ideological influence of community leaders on others (e.g., their ability to 
overcome resistance if they are supportive of corporations) 
Accessible 
communication 
processes  
- Access to developer mailing lists 
- Consistency with which the community maintains online FAQs and transparent 
documentation trough wikis, blogs, and community sites 
- Direct access to specific developers 
Clear governance 
structures within 
the community  
- Clear and visible order of trusted maintainers of code versions 
- Clear delineation of responsibilities among developers for specific modules and tasks 
- Ability to discern leaders 
Willingness to 
accommodate 
corporate interests 
- Searchable history of past community decisions on product versions (related to any 
company) 
- Revealed desire by community to tap into a company’s customer base for testers and 
users 
- Community’s willingness to commit to agreed-upon release dates  
 
While on occasion our companies found viable, corporation-friendly communities to work with, more 
often than not they needed to engage with the communities first and probe to see whether they could 
influence the development of communication processes and governance mechanisms that would result in 
good collaboration partners. Such influence was achieved by building reputation with community 
members by contributing developers, code, hardware, and other resources.  Companies A and B were not 
just evaluating from a distance, but actually nurturing through direct engagement what they referred to as 
“healthy communities” – viable, corporate-friendly communities that consistently produced high-quality, 
innovative products and services:  
 “From my experience with open source, clearly the biggest benefits are when you have really 
established a healthy community, whether that’s a community of committers but also a community 
of people who are using and providing you feedback about the software. You need that kind of 
cycle, that whole loop to be really a well-oiled machine, and in the best projects that is absolutely 
what happens, you get lots of feedback and you get lots of people’s eyes on the code to improve the 
quality and that just continues to cycle forward as the software matures” (Developer, Company B). 
4.4 Probing for a Healthy Ecosystem 
As we compared company documents from early days of open source engagements to a later time period, 
we noted a significant shift in the criteria used for partner evaluation for both firms. While initially the 
focus was on evaluating open products and services as well as community health, later documents paid 
more attention to other corporate players, including competitors, strategic partners, and clients, involved 
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with the community. Because overcoming internal resistance to working with open source communities 
was “really, really difficult,” the involvement of other reputable firms with the community was very 
helpful (Manager, Company B). Sometimes, our companies waited for others to demonstrate that a given 
community was worth pursuing:   
 “You were seeing all the companies waiting for the first one [corporate adopter] and then the 
second one to make the move, which were the bold ones. ‘Oh my God! They are doing that move! 
What happens to them? They are collapsing, or they will collapse in two years maybe.’ And you 
wait and when it works [you adopt].” (Manager, Company B).  
Often, customers were embracing the open source model faster than internal groups within A and B, and 
they were gravitating towards open source communities that had already developed a reputation among a 
wide set of corporations.   
“Now we also are using S-drive adoption, and it’s so early days, but what we found last year is 
that as soon as customers found out that the code was based on open source technology, they 
trusted it much more because they didn’t have to overcome a mental gap of like hey, what does 
(Company B) know about managing Linux. It’s no longer they trusted our offer, they’re trusting the 
community’s offer.” (Manager, Company B). 
As pioneers themselves, Companies A and B were often the ones recruiting other corporations to start 
supporting communities that they were involved in: 
“We’re saying, let’s go out and find a community that has a lot of corporations affiliated with it 
and saying, in order for us to make our own projects sustainable as a community project, not just 
as our project, we need to get other companies backing it.” (Manager, Company A). 
As managers shifted their attention to the involvement of other firms, they developed quantitative metrics 
to measure such involvement. For example, a quick check of the mailing lists showed developer 
affiliation, which allowed our evaluators to estimate number and types of firms involved with the 
community. Company members also attended offline hackathons and open source conferences where they 
recognized other reputable firms that were involved. They also evaluated the nature of the donated 
resources, including paid employees working in the community, code donations, support services 
provided, and sales of the paid version of the software.  As one manager noted: 
 “There needs to be money flowing through the system sustainably for people, for customers, to feel 
comfortable investing in the product and for developers to choose to spend their time honing their 
skills on it and for entrepreneurs to stake their businesses on it. So, the economy around a platform 
is important” (Manager, Company A).  
At the same time, managers started evaluating the technical features of the software code that would 
enable more firms to join as users and contributors. They looked at the concentration of APIs, the 
modularity of the code, and the number and range of complementary products being offered. They paid 
21 
 
special attention to the community’s attempts to make the code reusable by diverse participants and not 
specific to any one contributor’s needs.  
The ability of a company to judge how the network of relationships around an open source community –
an ecosystem – functioned was by no means immediate. It took some years of probing and learning before 
our companies were able to gauge which other commercial firms were involved in the ecosystem and how 
they were influencing critical decisions. Companies interested in joining an ecosystem would attend 
company-held or sponsored hackathon events where a mix of stakeholders usually showed up to network 
and learn about new projects being established in the ecosystem. Networking, discussions, and 
information sharing between all levels of stakeholders helped to establish a discourse about which 
company held greater influence and why.  
Surprising to us, our companies, which were likely to be quite influential in the ecosystems they chose to 
join, insisted on the importance of a strong and meritocratic governance of the ecosystem involved rather 
than just exerting unilateral influence. They noted the importance of an ecosystem “not being driven by 
one company’s agenda” (Strategist, Company B). The evaluation criteria shifted from the potential to 
build a promising proprietary relationship with a healthy community towards the appeal of participating 
in a healthy ecosystem. The latter refers to a sustainable, expanding set of diverse participants with a stake 
in the success of a given open source product, governed by transparent and meritocratic means. As one of 
the informants noted:  
“I’d really just look at numbers of commercial customers who are paying for services that are 
around the platform... And numbers of employees at companies whose job it is to provide that 
support. I really think a lot of Project X’s success has come from having a range of small firms that 
were going to take risks and be innovative…And you know it’s not the best written open source 
management platform, but I think it’s one of the very healthiest communities and one of the most 
sustainable projects by virtue of the way that the commercial process works around the platform” 
(Strategist, Company B).  
Table 7 summarizes indicators used for judging ecosystem health. 
Table 7: Evaluating Ecosystem’s Health 
 
2nd order theme 1st order concept 
Strength of ecosystem 
partners 
- Number of partners 
- Types of partners 
- Reputation of partners 
- Degree of commitment to the ecosystem 
 
Level of support by partners - Code and hardware donated 
- Paid employees working on the project 
 
Commercial acceptance of 
the chosen license regime 
- The use of the same license regime used for distributing the core code in 
distributing products developed by ecosystem partners 
- Number of dual licensing schemes set up by partners (presumably to avoid 
using the license regime of the core code, or to change the business 
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model) 
Modularity of the platform - Number of APIs 
- Number of modules shared and reused by partners 
- Number of modules developed by partners 
 
Ability to reuse components 
and complementary products 
- Level of reciprocity needed by the license 
- Generic versus specific nature of components  
- Degree of component embeddedness in partner’s products 
- Number of competing versions (forks) of the product 
 
Ecosystem governance 
structures 
- Type of leadership model in the ecosystem 
- Reliance on open source foundations in governance 
- Clear rules and regulations for negotiations 
- Historical basis for making decisions (merit or influence-based) 
 
Powerful influencers in the 
ecosystem 
- Number of influential partners  
- Number of smaller players in the ecosystem and their alignment with 
influential partners 
- Relationship between influential partners and the focal firm 
- Merits for gaining influence 
 
 
5 Discussion and Implications 
Our investigations of how decision makers evaluated which open source communities to partner with 
revealed that they underwent a journey through which their understanding of the most relevant evaluation 
criteria evolved.  In our analysis, the main task underlying these partnerships, which was to gain strategic 
benefits by incorporating open source software products into their commercial offerings, did not change 
over time. However, our informants realized that performing this task well involved achieving a number 
of different goals along the way, each requiring different evaluation criteria. Their learning journey allows 
us to theorize how different evaluation criteria fit different evolving goals of corporate partnerships with 
open source communities.  
Our inductive findings resonate with Shah and Swaminathan’s (2008) alliance partner selection 
framework. Similar to these researchers, we found that the most relevant criterion in partner selection 
varied with the situation. Moreover, we found that key evaluation criteria they have identified, namely, 
trust, commitment, reputational complementarity, and financial payoff could be usefully adapted to 
interpret our findings. For example, we can see that evaluating software products and services was 
focused on financial payoffs, while evaluating community viability was assuring community’s long-term 
commitment to developing the product. Similarly, evaluating community’s friendliness towards 
corporations was about establishing whether the community could be trusted. Part of the ecosystem health 
evaluation was about judging whether ecosystem participants had complementary market reputations 
which would create joint stakes in ecosystem’s success. At the same time, our decision makers were also 
assessing other aspects of the ecosystem health and not just of the specific partner -- community. 
Consistent with Shah and Swaminathan (2008), we also see that all four criteria, whether assessed 
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quantitatively or qualitatively, were used in every decision, but some criteria were more dominant than 
others depending on certain contingencies.   
A significant difference between Shah and Swaminathan’s (2008) framework and our findings is that the 
evaluation criteria used in choosing an open source community, with a handful of exceptions, were not 
applied to the potential relationship between a community and the corporation3 but rather to the 
community in general. For example, community viability metric was not focused on assuring commitment 
of the community to the firm, but rather on community members’ general commitment to developing and 
maintaining an innovative, high quality software product. Similarly, corporation friendliness metric was 
focused on making sure that any corporation could trust the community as a collaborator and not just our 
firms. The two components of trust identified by Shah and Swaminathan (2008), goodwill and 
competence, were indeed very relevant, but they were assessed in general terms as goodwill towards any 
corporate involvement and overall community’s process maturity. Ecosystem’s health was not squarely 
focused on assessing complementarity between ecosystem participants’ market reputations and the firm’s 
own, but rather about complementarity among market reputations of a large number of organizations with 
the stake in the success of the community and its products.  
Our firm’s focus on evaluating healthiness of the potential partner as an entity rather than on the specific 
proprietary benefits that they would accumulate is consistent with the notion that in open innovation 
partnerships both private and public goods are created (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). While our firms 
started with a traditional focus on creating proprietary gains from an alliance relationship by “taking” 
public goods and assessing how they benefited them, they quickly evolved their evaluation metrics 
towards overall community and ecosystem health. This is consistent with the notion that firms engaging 
with open innovation communities are participating in the creation of public goods that should over time 
give them some proprietary benefits, but not necessarily immediately (Baldwin and von Hippel 2011; von 
Hippel and von Krogh 2003; West and Gallagher 2006). Our firms quickly shifted their evaluation focus 
from a proprietary value capture in a relationship towards broader value creation in an open innovation 
ecosystem (Lichtenthaler 2011). 
Shah and Swaminathan (2008) drew on organizational control theory to argue that the dominant 
evaluation criteria is dictated by the nature of the alliance project/task. They argued that alliance’s task 
characteristics of outcome interpretability and process manageability defined the contingencies. If we 
were to draw on their framework literarily, we would be forced to classify long-term strategic corporate 
partnership with open source communities as having low outcome interpretability and low process 
 
3 For example, Shah & Swaminathan (2008) use relationship-specific measures such as “How critical is it that ABC 
acts in good faith in pursuing mutual partner interests in this alliance?” (p. 494) 
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manageability. This is because, due to the very nature of engaging with open innovation communities, 
corporations cannot fully control outcomes or processes in such communities. As a result, following the 
original framework, evaluators should primarily focus on those communities that exhibited reputational 
complementarity in the marketplace – communities that were part of well-established ecosystems with 
non-competing participants.  
This is not what we found. Instead, our data suggests that decision makers did not perceive outcome and 
process characteristics as exogenous attributes of the alliance task. Rather they proactively shaped the 
alliance task and the evaluation criteria as they were learning how to better interpret what outputs they 
were getting from the relationship and how to manage processes with the community. Thus, they either 
focused on more interpretable outcomes such as costs and benefits of adopting a particular software 
product or less interpretable outcomes such as the degree to which future products and services had the 
potential for meeting corporate needs (as part of community friendliness metric). Similarly, for process 
manageability, company decision makers made tough bets on whether or not they wanted to get involved 
in with poorly managed communities and invest heavily into co-creating good process.  
Finally, the new alliance tie between the firm and a community was not formed by picking the right 
partner for a particular alliance goal a priori, but rather the firms probed the communities through small 
scale engagements to see if there was potential for a productive alliance partnership co-evolution over 
time. Our informants clearly stated that it was impossible to understand the potential for value creation of 
a given open source community without participating in it. Similarly, it was hard or impossible to assess 
ecosystem health without both being part of an ecosystem and trying to shape it. Consistent with the 
partner-co-evolution perspective on alliance formation (Das and Teng 2000), corporations were willing to 
take risks in forging new partnerships without being able to perform a detailed evaluation of all criteria 
beforehand because they were willing to nurture open source communities and invest resources into 
ecosystem health so as to make these partnerships more attractive over time.  
Integrating these insights in Figure 2, we propose a theoretical framework for evaluating an open 
innovation community as an alliance partner based on alliance goals. 
 Process manageability: 
desirable 
Process manageability:  
not necessary 
Outcome 
Interpretability:  
not necessary 
Alliance Goal: Co-develop with community 
Key Criteria: Trust in the community’s 
willingness and process competence in 
collaborating with corporations 
Evaluation Metric: Community’s 
Friendliness to Corporations  
Alliance Goal: Supply and demand -side 
network effects in the ecosystem 
Key Criteria: Strength and complementarity 
of interests among ecosystem partners in the 
long-term success of the community   
Evaluation Metric:  Ecosystem Health  
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Outcome 
interpretability:  
desirable 
Alliance Goal: Rely on the product long-
term 
Key Criteria: Contributors’ commitment to 
keep producing the product 
Evaluation Metric: Community Viability  
 
Alliance Goal: Adopt the product 
Key Criteria: Financial payoff from using the 
product 
Evaluation Metric:  Firm’s Value from 
Community’s Product and Services 
Figure 2: Model of Selecting Open Innovation Community as Firm’s Alliance Partner 
 
6 Implications to Research 
As strategic corporate partnerships with digital open innovation communities are becoming more popular 
(Bogers et al. 2017; Greenstein and Nagle 2014), the number of communities that corporations can 
choose to partner with also grows. Yet, innovation management literature to date has not investigated how 
such alliance partners are chosen by organizational decision makers. We have investigated this question 
and propose a number of insights for the strategic alliance and digitization of innovation literatures. 
6.1 Implications for Strategic Alliance Literature 
Strategic alliance literature has historically focused on organizations forming alliances with other 
organizations using commercial arrangements such as signing contracts and investing equity (Kale and 
Singh 2009). We have argued that in its goals and nature a long-term strategic relationship with an open 
innovation community often serves the same purposes (e.g., conducting joint R&D or co-promoting a 
product) as a commercial strategic alliance. Moreover, recent empirical studies of software alliances (Han 
et al. 2012) treated relationships formed among commercial firms through their joint participation with 
the same open innovation community as examples of strategic alliances even though such alliances do not 
rely on traditional commercial arrangements. Our paper also proposes to treat a long-term strategic 
partnership with an open innovation community as a new digitally-enabled form of strategic alliance 
relationship, but we suggest that such a relationship could be formed between a firm and an open 
innovation community and not just among firms. Our work demonstrates how insights from traditional 
strategic alliance literature (e.g., Shah and Swaminathan’s 2008 framework) are relevant to studying these 
new relationships emerging in the digital age. We encourage future researchers to take this “traditional” 
literature seriously as they explore questions of governance, evolution, and outcomes of this new 
digitally-enabled forms of alliances.   
Strategic alliance literature has extensively discussed tie formation among partners in an alliance (as 
summarized in Table 1), but, to our surprise, the actual decision making of organizational actors in 
choosing alliance partners has not been studied extensively. Shah and Swaminathan (2008) undertook 
such a study and built an insightful theoretical framework, but they were not able to access decision 
26 
 
makers in their organizational context and relied on MBA students in evaluating their framework. We 
contribute to the literature on alliance tie formation in three key ways: 1) by conducting a rare empirical 
study of decision makers evaluating alliance partner choices in their organizational context; 2) by 
extending alliance partnership formation literature to new types of digitally-enabled innovation 
partnerships and showing how the framework changes as a result; 3) by highlighting the role of value 
creation over value capture in digital ecosystems. We will now elaborate on these three factors.  
First, our empirical investigation of the criteria that organizational decision makers were using in 
evaluating alliance partners revealed that they did not see the alliance task as having exogenous outcomes 
and process characteristics as proposed by Shah and Swaminathan (2008), but rather engaged in actively 
shaping whether they wanted to focus alliance goals on more or less interpretable outcomes and whether 
they wanted to invest in costly process management or not. This happened within the context of the same 
overall alliance task (of developing commercial offerings based on open source products), suggesting that 
recent literature that highlights the role of alliance task in alliance formation (Furlotti and Soda 
forthcoming) does not fully explain variations in our findings. Shah and Swaminathan (2008) used 
specific examples from the airline industry such as evaluating a partner for a code-sharing alliance versus 
evaluating an equipment supplier, which implied certain outcome and process characteristics. However, 
in practice, it is possible that these aspects of the relationship are associated with strategic goals of the 
alliance and not with objective task features. Future strategic alliance partner choice studies can help shed 
light on whether this finding is only relevant to digital innovation, which typically exhibits ambiguous 
goals (e.g., Fayard et al. 2018) and processes that are constantly in flux (Gulati et al. 2012) or is more 
generally common to all types of alliances than previously assumed.  
Second, our study extends Shah and Swaminathan’s (2008) framework to the new types of digitally-
enabled alliances that are not governed by traditional commercial arrangements and that involve co-
creation (Barrett et al. 2015) of public as well as private goods (von Hippel and von Krogh 2003). It was 
somewhat surprising to us that in spite of the differences in the governance regime, the key criteria 
identified in the framework and their relationship to process and outcome characteristics stayed relevant 
in our context. At the same time, the actual translation of these criteria to the new phenomenon was far 
from direct. Indeed, criteria such as partner’s commitment to the relationship seems hard to apply when a 
community of volunteers on a digital platform is often anonymous, has no formal obligation towards the 
corporation, and may be ideologically opposed to partnering with firms without making its opposition 
explicit until corporate engagement is already under way. We found that each of the four original criteria 
took a new form in this context, but, most importantly, that the evaluation was less focused on proprietary 
value capture in the relationship and much more focused on public value creation. Strategic alliance 
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literature has consistently acknowledged the importance of such value co-creating alliances (Barrett et al. 
2015) over the last 20 years (Doz 1996), but has not explicitly incorporated the focus on value creation 
(vs. capture) as an alliance partner selection consideration. This can be largely explained by the rather 
economics-driven slant in the literature. Yet, modern economics also accounts for the possibility of 
private benefit through public good creation (Brandenburger and Stuart Jr 1996).  It is not entirely 
surprising, therefore, that decision makers are paying more attention to this public benefit than they were 
previously given credit for. Future studies should consider to which degree value creation versus capture 
enters corporate decision makers’ evaluation criteria in alliances partner selection outside the context of 
open source alliances. Certainly, if scarce high-quality human resources are only willing to participate in 
healthy communities (Crowston et al. 2006), it is likely that consideration of community and ecosystem 
health will continue playing important role in partner evaluations beyond proprietary gains. 
Third, while strategic alliances literature offers plenty of evidence that new alliance ties are likely to form 
on the basis of social relations in inter-organizational networks (see Table 1), inter-organizational network 
considerations are not directly discussed in Shah and Swaminathan’s (2008) framework. Our findings 
show that these considerations were on the forefront of decision makers’ minds in choosing open 
innovation communities. This is not surprising given the importance of network effects in digital 
ecosystems both on the supply and demand side (e.g., Eisenmann et al. 2009; Wareham et al. 2014). 
While in our context ecosystem considerations were closest to the complementarity criteria in Shah and 
Swaminathan’s (2008) framework, ecosystem health is a much broader concept. Digital goods with high 
up-front fixed costs and strong network effects create synergies among diverse participants that go 
beyond aligned reputational stakes (Furr and Shipilov 2018; Helfat and Raubitschek 2018). Digital 
ecosystems bring together parties with directly conflicting goals (e.g., buyers and sellers or direct 
competitors), who, nonetheless, still have a common stake in maintaining a healthy ecosystem.  
6.2 Implications for Research on Digitally-enabled Open Innovation Communities 
There are a number of research implications for the literature on corporate engagement with open 
innovation communities. First, within open source literature, most studies that considered issues 
pertaining to community health take a perspective of a developer deciding which community to join. 
There is some degree of overlap between our findings that pertain to community health and this prior 
work. For example, researchers explored quantitative factors that could be used by a developer to indicate 
whether a given open source community is worth joining such as bug-fixing time, popularity of the 
project, and community size (Crowston et al. 2006; Izquierdo-Cortazar et al. 2010; Raja and Tretter 2012; 
Soto and Ciolkowski 2009). Some studies in this stream suggested that not only measurable markers, but 
also “social health” features such as knowing where a new developer can get help should be considered as 
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well (Head 2016). Perhaps, the most significant work in this domain focused on operationalizing 
ecosystem health by drawing on four prior published studies, all of which relied on archival data from 
code repositories (Jansen 2014). This work proposed a number of metrics that were consistent with those 
used by our informants such as metrics focused on product and support services (Table 4) and numbers 
and type of ecosystem participants and product modularity (see Table 7). While this work went into great 
depth in measuring things that can be scraped from code repositories, given its research goals, it did not 
focus on strategic factors involved in having a corporate entity engage with the community (e.g., 
corporate friendliness or license type), nor did they consider factors that are not easily assessed from code 
repositories such as the presence of democratic governance. Those researchers that have discussed 
community governance (Laffan 2012) still considered whether important decisions are accessible to a 
volunteer participant, not necessarily a corporate entity. Overall, our work builds on this stream of 
research and adds a number of considerations that are important to corporations that may not be directly 
relevant to volunteer developers. Most importantly, we show how various measures of community or 
ecosystem health relate to diverse goals of engaging with open innovation communities.  
Second, as already noted, both community and ecosystem health criteria used by our firms focused more 
on value creation than value capture. This is in contrast to prior studies of corporate engagement in open 
innovation that focused more on value capture, foregrounding such characteristics as a firm having 
influence on ecosystem decisions (Morgan et al. 2013) or benefiting from ecosystem participation of 
market leaders (Adner 2006; Han et al. 2012). Our findings partially align with this prior work in that our 
decision makers also paid attention to the resources invested by others in the ecosystem and product 
market synergies. However, when it came to the issue of influence, our companies soon realized that 
limiting the amount of influence any one player could exert (including their own) was crucial in 
sustaining a healthy ecosystem. Moreover, making sure that product architecture was built for wide reuse 
by potential future ecosystem participants (possibly competitors) meant again focusing on value creation 
at the expense of, at least in the short term, value capture. This finding is consistent with much of the 
writing on value creation versus value capture in open ecosystems (e.g., Eisenmann et al. 2009; Gawer 
2014; Wareham et al. 2014). Our work contributes by pointing out specific quantitative and qualitative 
criteria that firms can use in measuring ecosystem’s potential for value creation and value capture. While 
our participants did not optimize tradeoffs between these various criteria formally, future research can 
actually focus on doing such modeling, for example, analyzing tradeoffs between numbers of generic 
versus partner-controlled components in the ecosystem. 
Speaking more broadly to the literature on digitally-enabled (Rolland et al. forthcoming) open innovation 
beyond open source (e.g., Felin and Zenger 2014), we find that this work also rarely asks the question of 
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how to find the right partner. Theoretically, this literature would suggest matching community expertise 
with the company’s innovation task (e.g., Arazy et al. 2016; Felin and Zenger 2014; Lifshitz-Assaf 2018). 
Today, however, there are more and more open innovation communities offering similar professional 
expertise such as Kaggle, TopCoder, and Upwork for data science; NineSigma and Innocentive for 
scientific innovation, DesignCrowd and 99Designs for graphic design (e.g., Boudreau and Lakhani 2013; 
Kaganer et al. 2013). This means that firms have to go beyond choosing a partner based on whether its 
expertise fits their problem, towards evaluating community, and perhaps ecosystem, health. Future 
research can dig deeper into how these concepts and their measures vary across communities engaged in 
different types of work.    
6.3 Limitations  
Our work has three main limitations. First, as there was no readily available framework within open 
innovation literature focused on selecting an open innovation community, we appropriated a model from 
alliance literature. We had to adapt the model by Shah and Swaminathan (2008) to fit our purpose. While 
the correspondence between our inductive findings and deductive framework was not perfect, building on 
prior scholarship allowed us to interpret our findings in a more parsimonious and integrated fashion. At 
the same time, the differences between the framework developed for commercial alliances and our data 
helped us understand which aspects of the partner evaluation process were specific to this new setting and 
which ones were general to both old and new phenomena.  
Second, our study focused on open source community partnerships, which following a well-established 
research tradition (e.g., Shah 2006; von Hippel and von Krogh 2003; West and Gallagher 2006), we 
treated as examples of open innovation communities. It would be important for future studies to 
investigate which aspects of our findings are idiosyncratic to the open source context and which ones are 
generalizable beyond it.  
Finally, we focused on the multi-decade journey of two pioneer firms forming alliances with open source 
communities. It is possible that some of the goals and evaluation criteria used in forming these alliances 
are no longer relevant, while others have become dominant across industry. Moreover, it is possible that 
smaller or younger firms may have slightly different sets of concerns in entering an alliance partnership 
with an open innovation community than our firms had, necessitating further investigation.  
7 Conclusion  
Our work addresses the important question of how organizational decision makers select which open 
innovation communities to engage with as an alliance partner. While in the early days of company 
engagement with digitally-enabled open innovation communities this question was peripheral due to the 
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lack of choice in partnering, today, more and more open innovation communities are receptive to 
corporate engagement. The blurring of boundaries between internal and external work as well as between 
innovation processes and innovation outcomes associated with digital innovation (Nambisan et al. 2017) 
makes it particularly hard to make such evaluations. Moreover, the openness of participation and 
anonymity and fluidity of participants often characterizing digitally-enabled innovation communities 
(Faraj et al. 2011) leads to great difficulty in applying traditional criteria of trustworthiness and 
competence in choosing an alliance partner. Finally, digitally-enabled open communities are constantly 
evolving (Gulati et al. 2012) making partnering with them a moving target and necessitating a great 
degree of flexibility in adjusting organizational goals in such partnerships.     
We found that pioneer firms we have studied addressed these challenges head on. They learned from their 
experiences with digital innovation and developed new criteria for choosing open innovation communities 
as their alliance partners. The ability to define and collect these criteria benefited from the transparency 
often associated with processes and outcomes on digital innovation platforms (Nambisan et al. 2017). In 
the beginning, this very transparency prompted decision makers to focus on the most visible aspects of 
innovation – the value of tangible products and services produced by the community. Eventually, 
however, industry pioneers learned to move away from easily observable characteristics and developed 
more nuanced ones. They also learned to give up an outdated mindset primarily focused on private value 
capture from specific outcomes and embraced new categories of value more appropriate for the goal of 
partnering with the community in order to co-create public goods. Developing these measures 
inadvertently helped managers better understand the actual value proposition of participating in an open 
digital ecosystem. 
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Appendix 
 
Appendix 1: Relating our data to Shah and Swaminathan (2008) criteria 
Shah and 
Swaminathan’s 
Definitions 
Data Quotation Our contextualizing notes 
Trust  
 
Partner’s goodwill 
and avoidance of 
opportunism and 
confidence in 
partner’s ability to 
perform alliance 
task 
It pretty much comes down to what our customers 
want and what solution they are most 
comfortable with and again the total cost of 
ownership. Do we see the expertise to administer 
one of those solutions and is one community more 
competent than the other than another and that’s 
probably the one that we are going to be more 
comfortable with 
Trust as evident from a sense 
of competence and expertise 
of the open source partner.  
You know, the traditional models have been used 
in companies were very clunky, and nobody likes 
to use them because it seems like all contribution 
and no report but they found that with this open 
source approach, you know, that they were 
getting expertise coming in, they were getting 
better quality solutions. 
Competence based trust and 
reliance on open source 
community code offerings.  
First of all what comes are the synergies. You 
always have to look at the evolution of any bit of 
code. As in the last five years, if your answer is yes 
then, is the code you want supported by many 
others and that are leading … for what you need. 
This is where the community are important. These 
communities also hopefully make sure if individual 
and also other companies involved and so you will 
see that there will be more parties having similar 
concerns and similar difficulties as you are not the 
only corporate partner. In many cases someone 
has to start stepping in first. When you have the 
technologies and you want to hire people, so it is 
good that there is a community and any key 
contributor is a potential employee or any 
company there is a potential partner. All these 
aspects are important.  Actually, it’s not just 
pieces of software but that they are sustained by 
the community – which is alive.   
Trust built by collective 
contributions and signals of 
expertise. This fragment of 
interview data also resonates 
with commitment ideas – but 
we note a gentle building up of 
goodwill based trust through 
communal and collective 
contributions.  
We needed to have a trustworthy, credible proven 
technology. So we worked with an open source 
application. All that innovation was already done, 
it was out there and product development was 
much faster because we adopted that as the basis 
for our management aegis. 
Signal of expert software and 
clear capability offered by a 
good open source product.  
   
Complementarity 
 
Reputational 
complementarity 
In fact the patch tells you something else far more 
interesting which is it is a vote for a feature where 
instead of somebody saying I would love such and 
such, they have actually put some effort in and 
Reputation here is seen more 
as a signal from the 
community which is 
interesting – but not as a PR 
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among partners’ 
market 
reputations 
creating joint 
stakes around 
image with the 
customer 
done it, so you have shown them by expending 
some time, reputational capital, something that is 
important to them. So in open source this is how 
you look for things, you look for the things that 
have cost people time and money, so and you 
wait in favour of those. 
appeal by the alliance-seeking 
company.  
Now we also are using S-drive adoption and it’s so 
early days but what we found last year is that as 
soon as customers found out that the code was 
based on open source technology, they trusted it 
much more because they didn’t have to overcome 
a mental gap of like hey, what does (company X) 
know about managing Linux. It’s no longer they 
trusted our offer, they’re trusting the community’s 
offer. 
This section of data clearly 
signifies trust yet the main 
argument being made here is 
how customers recognized the 
value of open source and the 
company in question felt that 
making more of their 
engagement with open source 
would help attract more 
customers.  
   
Commitment  
 
Partner’s explicit 
or implicit pledge 
to make a tangible 
contribution to 
the relationship 
One thing, we sponsor those communities in some 
way or another for example, we donate most of 
the hardware for their infrastructure.  We 
sponsored different events like, Apache or even 
smaller community advance…so we did involve 
both with money and with contributions.   
Commitment through 
contribution: contribution to 
the product directly but it 
signals commitment to the 
larger ecosystem – thus 
attracting more partners. 
Talk about how they are moving towards a more 
organised development model, which … by all 
means continues to encourage the contributions 
from the industry at large, but, at the same time, 
keeps things more on track in terms of here, we 
are moving to this goal and the next goal and it’s 
not as patchy as it has been in the past. So, I do 
see the overall maturity of open source as it gets 
better and better to meet enterprise needs. I can 
see that improve. Also another part that helps 
there is, when you have these projects and, again, 
the more visibility they get, the more they are able 
to solve enterprise customer needs, the more that 
people from the community themselves will be 
able to contribute content.  
Ecosystem level commitment 
is crucial for sustainability of 
the community.  
Certainly the viability of the community. How 
stable is the software? How viable is the 
community around it? Are they fixing bugs?  
Looking at the list to see, are people responsive to 
problems or bugs getting fixed.  Is the community 
committed to supporting it?  That’s one of the big 
ones.  It is possible to sub contract to smaller 
companies for support for this. 
Commitment needs from the 
community and looking at the 
community level rather than 
larger ecosystem.  
 
This aligns with product 
related issues as a signal of 
health.  
What appeals to me, I think, is mainly two things. 
The fact that you are working with open 
standards as well. But the fact that you are 
working with an array of people.  You’ve identified 
This was a response to our 
question of why this company 
chooses to work with open 
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some common problems and then you are 
working within an array of people not within your 
own little, you know, company. The fact that you 
are bringing all these different people from all 
these different areas gives you the feeling that 
you are ultimately building something that is most 
acceptable to the widest array of end users, 
because you started with such a wide base of 
people feeding into the requirements. And, also, 
along with that, theoretically, you should get 
better coverage in terms of requirements, but also 
a sort of chair view of what’s happening and 
what’s the right direction to take on different 
topics. You can work solo on anything, really, but 
doing it as a group, you are going to bring in the 
group dynamic which causes more ideas to be 
brought in typically… humans just have to work 
better that way and be more successful, when the 
group dynamic is allowed to exist.  
source communities.  
What you are talking about is really how do you 
encourage more collaboration and more 
development or participation I should say, all on 
these open source projects where maybe you are 
leaving it, but you really want it to sustain and 
you want to get as many folks interested as 
possible. We have different incentives for doing 
that. It’s more of the focus to try and figure out, 
how do you promote, reuse and encourage people 
to participate and behave in this kind of more of 
an open source development methodology.   
This quotation is coded with 
commitment. It is also 
suggestive of ecosystem 
values.  
 
 
   
Financial payoff 
 
Tangible sources 
of value including 
reduction in costs, 
increase in profit, 
access to new 
markets, etc. 
 
 
Well, for the company involved it is driven by a 
project that you feel can help you do a better job 
with cheaper, faster, higher quality, if you use 
open source software, so that happens quite a bit 
and it can mimic systems inside of our company.   
Replies often to the question 
of how the manager chose the 
open source project to work 
with.  
 
 
Financial payoff recognized in 
the form of more efficient and 
cheaper software 
We just got lucky that those things came together 
… I can still remember some of the discussions we 
had at executive levels at (our company). Were 
you guys on drugs?  What do you want to do? It 
was a pretty radical… essentially we are 
commoditising. The pitch to our business partners 
was luck. We all want to work together to solve 
customers’ problems.  As a group, we’ve got 
limited amount of capital to invest. It’s the nature 
of the business, right? How are we going to invest 
to best meet our customers’ needs? We can all 
This was a reply to the 
question of why they moved 
into open source when there 
was no clear business model. 
Ecosystem value is evident 
here as is the idea that value 
creation and value capture are 
both layered in theory and 
practice. Companies are able 
to create some value together 
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choose to write the same thing over and over and 
over again. Whether that’s ten million dollars a 
year, we can all choose to spend ten million 
dollars a year to do the same thing repetitively to 
really give value to our customers or, we can 
choose to collaborate and with our contributors 
spend ten million dollars once and then use all the 
capital that’s left, and individually invest in value 
on top of that and choose to compete. 
while holding competitive 
value creation separate.  
The open source market started with only basic 
and very infrastructural requirements and then 
we added services and more value added services 
and more and more and more and we are on top 
of different layers and we are now offering very 
high quality and high level layers of services. But 
at each layer, you were seeing all the companies 
waiting for the first one and then the second one 
to make the move, which were the bold ones, oh 
my god, they are doing that move. What happens 
to them? They are collapsing and they will 
collapse in two years maybe? And you wait and 
when it works, okay, it works. I read in some 
magazine that they were making a lot of money 
thanks to that.   I have some pressure from my 
CEO to cut my expenses. I could do that and so 
then, when you have examples and you are under 
pressures, you slowly begin thinking that you 
could do that too. But you wait, always for 
someone to do it first.  The first one usually is 
really a bold one.   
This interviewee explained 
that the initial move into using 
and working with open source 
communities involved the bold 
first movers – value creation 
and capture were both hazy 
with regard to open source. 
Once the ecosystem began to 
grow then more companies 
jumped in to reap different 
forms of value. 
 
 
